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OPINION: 
DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] Appellants, Steve and Catherine Smith (the Smiths), filed suit against appellee, Mel 
Frandsen dba Mary Mel Construction Company (Mary Mel), seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and fraudulent concealment 
after the footings, foundation, and structure of their home settled, allegedly due to improper 
soil compaction and a general lack of lateral support. 
[*P2] The trial court granted Mary Mel's motion for summary judgment, and the Smiths 
filed a timely [ * *2 ] notice of appeal. We affirm. 
FACTS 
[ *P3] I i i tlte early 1990s, Mary Mel purchased land in Lehi City with the intention of 
developing the property for residential use. In the period up to 1995, Mary Mel obtained 
approval from local government agencies and constructed and installed the roads, curbs, 
gutters, sidewalk, and utilities in what is now the Summer Crest Subdivision. On October 10, 
1995, Mary Mel conveyed the properties, divided and improved, to Patterson Constn iction 
(Patterson), a residential developer with whom Mary Mel had an ongoing business 
relationship. Patterson, in +:.\rr. -onveyed a portion of the property, lot 223, on the same day 
to GT Investments (KT\, 
[ *P4 ] GT is a licensed general contractor. GT, acting through one of its employees, Joseph 
Sharp (Sharp), constructed a home on lot 223. During construction, Sharp "personally 
inspected the . . . lot and viewed the condition of the lot before purchase and before building 
commenced." As the Smiths assert in their complaint, despite the fact that "the soil [on lot 
223] was so soft that anyone walking on it would leave an imprint," Sharp, allegedly as a 
result of his lack of experience in contracting, [ * * 3 ] ignored this "red flag" and failed to 
order any soils testing or other measures that would have revealed that the soil on lot 223 
was inadequately compacted. After completing construction, GT delivered a warranty deed to 
the Smiths on August 26, 1996. 
[ *P5 ] Since occupying the home, the Smiths have experienced "significant settlement of 
the house, its footings, foundations and structure." In seeking recovery for damage caused 
by the subsidence, the Smiths argue that GT "knew, should have known, or negligently failed 
to determine that the House was built on inadequate soil material and/or inadequately 
compacted soil." They additionally claim that in subdividing and developing the property prior 
to its conveyance to Patterson, Mary Mel performed "certain excavation work . . . including 
filling in a low area or ravine" running through lot 223. As a result, the Smiths allege, Mary 
Mel "knew that the lot [included] unconsolidated fi l l, and failed to take proper steps to 
compact [ the] lot, and in fact concealed and/or failed to disclose these facts to appropriate 
government entities and prospective purchasers." It is upon these facts that the Smiths 
assert claims against GT, Sharp, [ * * 4 ] Mary Mel, and Patterson. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[ * P 6 ] In reviewii ig a gi at., *., vve give no deference to u • . • v. *• 
with respect to its legal cono ^ Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 ... i 14, P 13*. 
70 P.3d 35. Rather, we make our own • on as to whether the record shows "that 
there is no genuine issue as to any mate. i... i i md that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P 56(c). Nevertheless, we may affirm the result 
reached by the trial court '"if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis 
of its ruling." Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, P 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998)). 
[ *P7 ] f lary I Ae\, pui st jai it to Utah Rule Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2), ui ges tl lis coui t to 
uphold summary judgment, asserting that since the appellants have failed to provide a copy 
of the summary judgment hearing transcript, "the district court's decisions are presumed to 
be valid." However, Mary Mel misconstrues [ * * 5 ] the meaning of n ile 1 1(e)(2). 
[ * P 8 ] The rule simply requires appellants to include "a transcript of all evidence" relevant 
to a challenged finding or conclusion. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). In this case, neither party 
claims that the missing transcript contains evidence bearing on the determination of the 
case. See Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 775 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), rev'd ii 
part and vacated in part on other grounds by Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, 26 P3_d 
193. Thus, appellants had no obligation to include the transcript in the record on appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
I Tl IEORIES OF I I <\BII I T V . 
[ * P 9 ] Appellants seek compensatory and punitive damages against Mary Mel under three 
different theories of liability: negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and fraudulent 
concealment. In order to prevail under any of these causes of action, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate the existence of a duty running between the parties. For example, with respect 
to negligent misrepresentation, we stated in Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 Utah 2d 
378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967), that "where one . . . carelessly or negligently [ * * 6 ] 
makes a false representation . . ., expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and the 
other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can be 
held responsible if the other elements of fraud are also present." n l 
voles 
n l We clat ified this test in Price-Qrem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown &Gunnel l , Inc., 713 P.2d 
55, 59 n,2 (Utah 1986), wherein we indicated that the suggestion in Jardine that "all of the 
elements of fraud must also be proven is dictum. Although the cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation grew out of common law fraud, the elements of fraud need not be 
independently established." 
[ * P 1 0 ] Ordinarily, in order to prevail in an action for negligent misrepresentation, plaintiffs 
must identify a "representor [who] makes an affirmative assertion which is false." Ellis v. 
Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah 1962); see also Baskin v. Mortgage & Trust, 
Inc., 837 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. App. 1992) [ * * 7 ] (upholding summary judgment in favor 
of a third-party lender who made no representations to plaintiffs in connection with the 
purchase of their homes). Indeed, Mary Mel makes a point of claiming that it made no 
representations, false or true, to the Smiths. The Smiths, however, contend that b> 
conveying the property (jointly with Patterson) without '-dicating that the lot was unsuitable 
for construction, Mary Mel effected a rom^c, •• - » r — <- h. >- * , -.,->^ * - „ ,--»~n 
representation to then i 
[ * P 1 1 ] Ii i t l le past, LlLuii v_dses I lave acknowledged tl lat "i tegliges it n lisrepr esei t idU. 
form of fraud." Atkinson v. IHC Hosps,, Inc., 798 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990); see also 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983) ("Negligent 
misrepresentation is a tort which grew out of common-law fraud."); Robinson v. Tripco Inv., 
Inc., 2000 UT App 200, P 3 1 , 21 P.3d 219 (Billings, J., dissenting) (identifying negligent 
misrepresentation as a "species" of fraud). Thus, interpreting the elements of the ton i 
manner consistent with principles of common-law fraud, we have found that in additio; • 
affirmative misstatements, [ * * 8 ] an omission may be actionable as a negligent 
misrepresentation where the defendant has a duty to disclose. Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980) ("Misrepresentation may be made either by 
affirmative statement or by material omission, where there exists a duty to speak."); DeBry 
v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 fUtah Ct. App. 1992) (denying liability for an 
"implied" misrepresentation where the defendant mortgage company owed no duty tc-
disclose information to purchasers of real property). Thus, a duty to d r r ^ s e ^ ;> -eo:;••—-:-
element of the tort of negligent misrepresentation, 
[*P12] Ii i additioi i, it is well establish led ii i oui law tl lat "without a uuiy, v : • .. . . J 
negligence as a matter of law, and summary judgment is appropriate." Ta l lma: \ , , City ui 
Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, P 5, 985 P.2d 892 (quoting Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 19941). Finally, in order to establish fraudulent 
concealment, "a plaintiff must prove the following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed 
information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information [ * * 9 ] is known to the party failing 
to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 
52, P 24, 48 P.3d 235: see also Fennel! v. Green, 2003 UT App. 291 , P 10, 77 P.3d 339: 
McDouqal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Fraudulent concealment 
requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or 
otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him"). Therefore, a duty to disclose is 
material to each of the alleged causes of action. 
[ * P 1 3 ] The pivotal question in this case is thus whether Mary Mel owed a duty to disclose 
the nature and existence of any subsurface defects, not only to its immediate successors in 
t i t le, Patterson and GT, but also to the subsequent and more remote purchasers, the Smiths. 
n2 
Footnotes 
n2 Because we find the resolution of this issue dispositive of the case, we decline to address 
the merits of Mary Mel's alternative argument that the Smith's allegation of negligent 
misrepresentation is barred by the economic loss rule. 
End Footnotes [**10] 
I I . DUTY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS TO REMOTE PURCHASERS 
A. Defining the Limits of a Developer's Duty 
[ * P 1 4 ] "The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be determined 
by the court." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). Courts consider many factors, 
none of which is dispositive, in determining when a duty runs between parties. Debry v. 
Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d, 1000, 1007 ("A duty to speak will be found from 'all the 
circumstances of the case and by comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end 
in view by the contracting parties.'" (quoting Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 
802, 804 (Utah 1963) (citation omit ted))) . n3 
Footnotes 
n3 See e.g., Price-Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 60 (foreseeability); Christenson v. 
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 19831 (privity of contract); Ellis 
v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Utah 1962) (statutory obligations); House v. 
Armour of Am. , Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 549-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (whether user possesses 
special knowledge, sophistication, or expertise). 
- End Footnotes [**11] 
[ * P 1 5 ] Particularly in the realm of tort law, "the duty c o n c e p t . . . is a policy 
determination." Debry, 835 P.2d at 1003-04 ("Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that 
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.") (citations omitted). For example, policy was 
one factor motivating our decision in Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 
1987), adopting the position of the Wyoming Supreme Court extending the duty of disclosure 
to developers engaged in subdividing and improving lots for residential purposes. In 
Anderson v. Bauer, upon which Loveland relies, the Wyoming Supreme Court observed that 
"as we developed from a rural to an urban society, . . . builders constructing great numbers 
of houses acquired considerable knowledge and expertise in the area and used engineering 
services and studies to determine soil conditions . . . and other questions concerning 
suitability for construction." 681 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Wyo. 19841. n4 
Footnotes 
n4 See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979) ("The average 
purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of 
the component parts of a residential structure."). 
End Footnotes - [**12] 
[*P16] Therefore, in order to protect unsophisticated purchasers, under Loveland, a 
developer, subdivider or person performing similar tasks has 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable 
for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house, and he must 
disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to 
know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building. He has a 
further duty to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has developed in the course 
of the subdivision process which is relevant to the suitability of the land for its 
expected use. 
Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769. n5 
- Footnotes 
n5 See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo, 1979) ("The average 
purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of 
the component parts of a residential structure."). 
End Footnotes- -
[*P17] Notwithstanding our holding in Loveland [ * *13 ] , the duties owed by contractors 
and developers are not without limitation. Even where a duty is found to exist, it does not 
continue indefinitely. Absent intentional fraud, "it continues only until the vendee, or his 
successor, have had adequate time and opportunity, through occupation of the land or 
otherwise, to discover the existence of the condition, and to take effective precautions 
against it by repair or other means." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt. g (1965). n6 
Thus, the duties running from vendor to vendee and subvendee persist only until a 
subsequent purchaser knows or should know of the defect in the property. 
Footnotes 
n6 See also House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(recognizing the "sophisticated user doctrine" whereby the manufacturer of a product is 
relieved of a duty to warn of the inherent dangers associated with a product if the purchaser 
is a sophisticated user and is charged with knowledge of the product); see generally Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-11-17 (2000) (relieving real estate vendors of 
liability where "it is proved that the purchaser knew of the [vendor's] untruth or omission."); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 388 (1965); id. § 353 (a vendor of real property is only 
liable for failing to disclose conditions on real property if the "the vendee does not know or 
have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and the vendor . . . has reason to 
believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk"). 
End Footnotes [**14] 
B. Application to the Facts 
[ *P18 ] In this case, there is no dispute that Mary Mel conveyed the property to Patterson 
and then to GT. GT is a licensed general contractor in the state of Utah, and like developers, 
the law imputes to builders and contractors a high degree of specialized knowledge and 
expertise with regard to residential construction. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 
A.2d 1283, 1292 (NJ . 1979) ("Whether the builder be large or small, the purchaser relies 
upon his superior knowledge and skill, and he impliedly represents that he is qualified to 
erect a habitable dwelling. He is also in a better position to prevent the existence of major 
defects."); Groff v. Pete Kinqslev Bidq., Inc., 374 Pa. Super. 377, 543 A.2d 128, 133 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1988) ("The professional builder is expected to have the skill and expertise to 
know how to guard against potential structural problems. Moreover, the builder is in the best 
position to prevent structural defects."); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 
(Wyo. 1979) ("Consumer protection demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely 
on the skill of [ * * 1 5 ] the builder and that the house is constructed so as to be reasonably 
fit for its intended use."). 
[ *P19 ] In particular, builder-contractors are expected to be familiar with conditions in the 
subsurface of the ground. See Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 2 1 , 377 P.2d 889, 8 9 1 , 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963) (holding a residential contractor negligent where "a reasonably prudent 
person under like or similar circumstances and as a result of making said excavations for 
foundation footings would have discovered the insufficient compaction of the underlying earth 
material, and would have caused soil tests and investigations to be made before proceeding 
with the building"); Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 65 Cal.Rptr. 689, 697 (Cal, App. 
1968) (finding a contractor was negligent for "constructing [a] house upon unstable and filled 
ground, containing an underground spring, without taking protective steps for providing 
adequate drainage"); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 938 (Wyo. 1981) ("We 
hold this to be the duty of ABC as builders to appellees: To furnish a safe location for a 
residential structure, and it may [ * * 1 6 ] be negligence to not do so"). See generally 
Annotation, Duty of Contractor to Warn Owner of Defects in Subsurface Conditions, 73 
A.LR.3d 1213 (1976) (collecting cases from various jurisdictions in which "it was held that a 
contractor who knows, or should know, of a defect in a particular subsoil does not perform 
his contractual obligations in a workmanlike manner if he fails to notify the owner of the 
existence of the condition"). 
[ *P20] The facts indicate that Sharp, the GT employee supervising the excavation and 
placement of the Smith's foundation, had "no prior construction experience." Nevertheless, 
GT is deemed to possess the knowledge of a reasonably prudent builder-contractor under 
similar circumstances, and, as a matter of law, a builder of ordinary prudence would have 
discovered the insufficient compaction on lot 223. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 
Conn. 370, 441 A.2d 620, 624 (Conn. 1982); Foust v. McKniqht 675 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (La. 
Ct. App. 1996) ("[A] vendor-builder of a residence is considered to be a manufacturer, and 
as such he cannot avoid the conclusively presumptive knowledge of the defects in [ * * 1 7 ] 
the thing he manufactures.") (citations omitted); Schamens v. Crow, 326 So. 2d 621, 626 
(La. Ct. App. 1975) (same); George B. Gilmore Co. v. Garrett, 582 So. 2d 387, 393 (Miss. 
1991); March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 894-95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (imputing knowledge 
of faulty construction to residential builder). In addition, the Smiths themselves allege in 
their complaint that GT "knew, should have known, or negligently failed to determine that 
[their] house was built on inadequate soil material and/or uncompacted fill." 
[*P21] The parties agree that Mary Mel conveyed the property to Patterson and GT, both 
parties who, as a matter of law, possessed superior knowledge and expertise regarding the 
subsurface conditions on lot 223. Where a developer conveys property to a residential 
contractor, the knowledge and expertise of the builder, and the independent duties owed 
thereby, interrupt certain obligations running from the initial developer to subsequent 
purchasers. In other words, borrowing from the language of the Restatement, we find that by 
conveying to one having "adequate time and opportunity" to discover the subsurface 
defects [ * *18] in lot 223, Mary Mel incurred no liability to remote purchasers of the 
property as a matter of law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt. g (1965). Mary 
Mel had no duty extending beyond its conveyance to Patterson and GT, to both of which the 
law imputes a high degree of knowledge and expertise. n7 
Footnotes 
n7 In doing so we do not address the merits of any suit involving Patterson, GT and the 
Smiths or between Mary Mel and GT. 
End Footnotes 
[*P22] The present case is distinguishable from those relied upon by the Smiths. For 
example, in Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of South Carolina, 255 S.C. 517, 
180 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1971), the South Carolina Supreme Court found a developer had a duty 
to disclose to a subsequent purchaser that "in developing and subdividing its land into lots to 
be sold for residential use only, [it] filled an enormous gully with stumps and other rubble to 
a depth of twenty to twenty-five feet and concealed this fill by covering [ * *19 ] it with soil." 
Id. at 208. However, when that case was decided in 1971, builder-contractors were not 
universally held to the same high standards that they are today. As the cases cited above 
indicate, the adoption of builder-contractor liability is a fairly recent phenomenon. n8 See 
Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 657 n.2 (Fla. 1983) (documenting a trend beginning in 
the late 1960s and extending through the early 1980s whereby builder-vendors were held 
liable to immediate purchasers under an implied warranty of habitability). 
Footnotes -
n8 Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979), also relied on by the Smiths, is 
inapposite because it involves a suit brought by residential contractors, rather than 
homeowners, against a developer. 
- - End Footnotes 
[*P23] Appellants also point to Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984). In that 
case, the court placed primary responsibility on builders and contractors to ensure the 
suitability of the land for construction of residences. [ * *20 ] There, the lots at issue were 
suitable for some form of dwelling house, although some of the lots were admittedly unfit for 
homes with basements. Id. at 1323. But, as the court observed, "whether the particular 
house to be built was a house with no basement, a half basement, a tri-level house, or a full 
basement was a decision not involving the developer." Id . Therefore, the court relied on the 
knowledge and judgment of the builder in finding that the developer had satisfied his duty 
and was not liable to homeowners. Likewise, our decision today requires contractors to be 
accountable, either directly or through explicit warranties from their predecessors in t i t le, for 
the suitability of the land upon which they build. 
[ * P 2 4 ] Those cases that do find developers liable to remote purchasers involve factual 
settings in which the developer was also the builder-contractor or otherwise include a chain 
of title with no intermediate sophisticated purchaser. See Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 
Cal. App. 3d 171. 183 Cal.Rptr. 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982V, Washington Rd. Developers, LLC v. 
Weeks, 249 Ga. App. 582, 549 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001V T * *211 Moxley v. Laramie 
Builders. Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979V 
C. Policy Implications 
[ * P 2 5 ] Our holding today furthers the purposes and policies underlying the recognized 
exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor, and is not inconsistent with our prior caselaw on 
duty issues generally, or Utah statutes. As a result of their superior knowledge, residential 
home-builders in other jurisdictions have consistently been held liable to subsequent as well 
as immediate purchasers. Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 
(Colo. 1983) (citing cases from eight different states in which subsequent purchasers were 
held able to state a claim for negligence against a builder); see also Timothy E. Travers, 
American Law of Products Liability § 38:19 (3d ed. 1987); Michael A. DeSabatino, Liability of 
Builder of Residence for Latent Defects Therein as Running to Subsequent Purchasers from 
Original Vendee, 10 A.L.R. 4th 385 (2004). Just as the lack of purchaser sophistication 
motivated the initial exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor, the expansion of builder-
contractor liability to encompass even remote purchasers [ * * 2 2 ] is similarly driven. Like 
initial consumers of residential construction, subsequent homeowners typically possess no 
greater sophistication that would enable them to discover latent defects in the property. 
Tusch Enters, v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022, 1034 (Idaho 1987) ("The same policy 
considerations that lead to [our adoption of the implied warranty of habitability for sales of 
new homes] . . . are equally applicable to subsequent homebuyers.'" (quoting Richards v. 
Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984))); see also Dwight F. 
Hopewell, C. Oates v. Jag: Let the Buyer Beware-A Remedy for Subsequent Purchasers of 
Homes in North Carolina, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1485, 1493 (1986) ("[A] subsequent purchaser of 
real estate is in a very similar position to that of the initial purchaser. Both are innocent 
purchasers who lack the expertise and knowledge necessary to uncover every latent defect . 
. . . Thus, both classes of purchasers deserve equal protection"). 
[ * P 2 6 ] By implication, where a subsequent purchaser is not similarly situated but rather 
possesses some unique insight or information [ * * 2 3 ] with respect to the property, liability 
may not be extended to subsequent purchasers. See Tusch Enters., 740 P.2d at 1038 
(Shepard, J., dissenting) (arguing that liability should be denied where "the plaintiffs . . . are 
not unknowing buyers of a residence built by an unscrupulous builder/developer[.] Rather, 
plaintiffs are a sophisticated and knowledgeable group of investors in real estate"). As the 
cases cited above indicate, residential builders and contractors are not innocent transferees 
occupying the same position as the ultimate residential consumer. Extending the liability of 
developers beyond builder-contractors to encompass remote purchasers is inconsistent with 
the rationale upon which recovery by subsequent purchasers was initially based. 
[ * P 2 7 ] As a policy matter, we believe that our holding will encourage builders and 
contractors to exercise that level of care consistent with the expertise legally imputed to 
them. In addition, our decision preserves the contractual expectations of developers and 
builder-contractors. I f unstable soil conditions are known to both the developer and the 
builder-transferee, the price of the land may be discounted to [ * * 2 4 ] reflect the added cost 
involved in correcting the defect. See Transamerica Ins. Servs. v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d 1283, 
1284 (Ind. 1991) (dealing with a property transaction in which a buyer "was given a credit 
against the purchase price of [a] new lot to compensate [the buyer] for the expense they 
incurred in correcting the soil conditions on the previous lot"). By requiring plaintiffs 
generally to sue up the chain of title, the allocation of risk and expectations embodied in land 
sale contracts will be preserved. n9 
- Footnotes 
n9 It is, of course, likely that increases in costs incurred by builders will be passed on to 
purchasers, but presumably those increases will be outweighed by losses avoided because of 
higher standards in the building process. 
End Footnotes 
CONCLUSION 
[*P28] We hold that Mary Mel's duty of care and disclosure extended only to its immediate 
transferees, Patterson and GT, who "knew or should have known" of defects in the property, 
and not to the appellants. The order granting summary [ * *25] judgment is affirmed. 
[*P29] Justice Parrish and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion. 
CONCURBY: WILKINS 
CONCUR: 
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice, concurring in the result: 
[*P30] I concur with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion that Mary Mel owed 
no duty to the Smiths, and that as such a summary judgment in Mary Mel's favor was 
proper. Mary Mel conveyed the lot to Patterson Construction, who conveyed to GT 
Investments, who conveyed to the Smiths. No theory advanced by the Smiths supports 
extension of a duty to disclose that far. The remaining analysis regarding the duty of home 
builders to disclose subsurface conditions to buyers is dicta at best. 
[*P31] We need not, nor are we asked to consider the duty, if any, running from a home 
builder to a home buyer to disclose non-obvious defects in the land that may or may not be 
known by the builder. To do so in this case simply extends our analysis not only beyond the 
facts and law considered by the trial court, but also beyond the facts and law necessary to 
resolve the case. There is no need for us to rely on the law of numerous other jurisdictions to 
fashion a new duty under Utah law to [ * *26 ] be imposed on home builders. 
[*P32] As a result, I would affirm the trial court on the sole basis that the law imposed no 
duty on Mary Mel to disclose anything regarding the condition of the property to the Smiths, 
and that as a direct result the causes of action advanced by the Smiths against Mary Mel fail 
as a matter of law. 
[*P33] Justice Durrant concurs in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' concurring opinion. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3, this 
Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Do issues of fact exist regarding whether the Defendant/Appellee knew of the 
non-disclosed information? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: DeNovo. Because this is a question of 
law, the trial court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed 
for correctness. White v. Gary L. Deeselhorst. NP Ski Corp.. 879 P.2d 1371,1374 (Utah 
1994). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a construction defect case brought by Plaintiffs/Appellants 
("Homeowners") who purchased a lot from Defendant/Appellee ("Builder") and hired the 
Builder to build them a custom home on said lot. Although notifying the Builder shortly 
after moving into the house of certain defects, it was not until the Homeowners attempted 
to sell their home in 2002 that they discovered collapsible soil beneath their house, which 
caused substantial cracking and settling. The Homeowners then brought suit against the 
Builder, claiming (1) fraudulent concealment, (2) fraudulent non-disclosure, (3) breach of 
warranty, (4) mutual mistake, and (5) unilateral mistake. 
B. Proceedings Below 
Homeowners instituted this action by filing a Complaint on April 27, 2002. On a 
subsequent motion to compel arbitration submitted by the Builder, the trial court 
dismissed the Homeowners' warranty and mistake causes of action so that they could be 
arbitrated. Thereafter, on August 25, 2003, the Builder filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment to dismiss the Homeowners' remaining claims of fraudulent concealment and 
fraudulent non-disclosure, which the trial court granted on October 10, 2003. The 
Homeowners appeal this award of summary judgment. 
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C. Material Facts 
1. In March of 1995, the Homeowners signed a Purchase Agreement and Deposit 
Receipt ("Agreement") for a house to be built by the Builder located in Lindon, Utah 
("the House"). (R at 720, U 1.) (See, Exhibit A attached hereto). 
2. On September 27,1995 the Homeowners closed on the House. (R at 720, If 2.) 
3. Beginning in 1996 and into 1997, the Homeowners noticed cracks in the 
foundation of the House, the basement floor and the driveway. Doors throughout the 
House had shifted and were hard to open and close. The Homeowners discussed tehse 
problems with the Builder in 1997 who, after their own inspection, told the Homeowners 
to, "Don't worry about cracks, these are normal." (Rat 719, ^ f 3.) The Builder was 
"100% sure" of this. Id 
4. Prior to the Homeowners' problems (i.e. within 30 days of October 24,1995), a 
number of the Builder's other homes neighboring the Homeowners' House also 
experienced similar settling problems. This included houses located very close to the 
Homeowners' House (i.e. lots 305, 306, etc.). (R at 719, f 4.) 
5. One of these neighbors was a couple named the Seawrights, who complained to 
the Builder of cracks in April of 1995. (R at 719, If 5.) 
6. The Builder hired AGRA Earth and Environmental ("AGRA") to inspect the 
Seawrights' property. The Builder's Vice President (at the time), Brad Simons, wrote the 
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Seawrights a letter on October 6, 1995 telling them that AGRA discovered collapsible 
soils two to three feet thick underlying the Seawrights' house, and in an October 25,1995 
letter, Mr. Simons discusses piering the Seawrights' house to remedy the settling 
problem. (Rat71946.) 
7. In February of 2002, due to a change in employment, the Homeowners put the 
House up for sale and soon procured a buyer. The buyer had an inspection done by Ken 
Karren, who informed the buyer of the potential collapsible soil in the Homeowners' 
neighborhood. (R at 718,17.) 
8. Not only did the Homeowners lose the sale on their House because the buyer 
backed out on account of the settlement issues, but it will cost them over $200,000 to 
repair the House. (Rat 718, Tf 8.) 
9. Mr. Karren explained in his report to the Homeowners dated April 23, 2002, 
that "the large differential settlement present in [the Homeowners'] house most probably 
resulted from the presence of collapsible soils." (R at 718, ^ f 9.) 
10. Mr. Karren testified that the Delta report "indicated that there was deep 
collapsible soil . . . in [the Homeowners'] neighborhood." (R at 718,110.) 
11. Thereafter, the Homeowners hired IGES to conduct an investigation into the 
soils underlying their Lot. IGES' professional engineer Kent Hartley conducted soils 
testing in April of 2002 on the soil underlying the southwest comer of the House and 
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discovered collapsible soil 27feet below the House. (R at 717, \ 11). 
Facts Regarding the AGRA Soils Report 
12. Mr. Simons, as Vice President for the Builder, purchased the land on behalf of 
the Builder that later became the Panorama Point subdivision (and which included the 
Homeowners' future lot). (R at 717, U12.) 
13. The Builder purchased the land in three parcels. The third and last parcel of 
land was previously owned by the LDS Church ("LDS Parcel'5). (R at 717, f 13.) 
14. The Builder had a soils study done on the first two parcels only (and not the 
LDS Parcel) by AGRA in 1995. (R at 717,114.) 
15. The AGRA soil report revealed that there was collapsible soil on the two 
parcels, which includes the Homeowners' Lot. (R at 717, % 15.) 
16. The Builder never disclosed the AGRA soil report to the Homeowners. (Rat 
717,H16.) 
17. Bill Gordon was the engineer who did the various AGRA reports on the two 
"non-LDS" parcels that the Builder developed into Panorama Point subdivision. (R at 
716,1| 17). The Builder later hired Mr. Gordon to look at the Homeowners' House in 
1997. Mr. Gordon provided Mr. Simons a written report, which recommends replacing 
the footings under the Homeowners' home or underpinning it with a pier system. He 
made clear that there were settling/soil problems. (R at 716, fflf 19-20.) 
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Facts Regarding the LDS Parcel and the Delta Report 
18. On April 9, 1992, the LDS Church, through its real estate representative 
Blaine Livingstone, sold the LDS Parcel to the Builder. The LDS Parcel is adjacent to 
(i.e. touches) the Homeowners' Lot. (R at 716, ^  21.) (See, Exhibit B is a map showing 
the Homeowners Lot (304) touching the LDS Parcel (labeled, "Panorama Pointe 'B'" on 
the map). 
19. Prior to the LDS Church selling the LDS Parcel to the Builder, the LDS 
Church engaged Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. to conduct a soils test on the LDS 
Parcel. (Rat715,f 22.) 
20. The LDS Church sold the LDS Parcel to the Builder pursuant to the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement, a document typed by Mr. Simons. (R at 715, ^ j 23.) (See, 
Exhibit C attached hereto). Just above the signature of "J. Bradley Simons, Vice 
President Woodside Homes Corporation" on the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, it 
states: "Seller to provide a copy of the soils report [i.e. the Delta Report] previously 
completed on the property prior to closing."1 (R at 715, fflf 23-25.) 
21. Mr. Livingstone discussed this disclosure of the Delta Report in the Earnest 
1
 In comparison, when the Builder sells a property, it intentionally does not use the 
state-sanctioned "Seller Disclosure" form. In fact, the only written disclosure of any kind 
that was given to the Homeowners at the time of their sale regarded "pressurized water 
that came through the area," and had nothing to do with the bad soils underlying their lot. 
(Rat 715, n8.) 
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Money Sales Agreement: 
Q: Why did you have that in there? 
A: I wanted to disclose the condition of the soils for construction purposes. 
We found it unsuitable for our construction purposes and I was aware that 
The Builder would be developing and constructing on the site and so we 
wanted them to be fully aware of the soils conditions they purchased, so 
that there would be no liability coming back subsequent to the sale. 
(Rat 7154 26.) 
22. Not only did the LDS Church, through Mr. Livingstone, disclose the existence 
of the Delta Report in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, but several pages from the 
Delta report were even attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (R at 714, f 27.) 
(See, Exhibit C). 
23. Mr. Livingstone further testified that the Builder was given a copy of the Delta 
Report at the time of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement: 
Q: Do you know if they [the Builder] were given a copy of [the Delta 
Report]? 
A: I do. They were given that. 
Q: At the time of this sale, roughly? 
A: Yes. 
(Rat 625-26.) 
24. When the Builder purchased the LDS Parcel, the LDS Church informed the 
Builder that there were problems with the soil on the LDS Parcel. (R at 714, ]f 29.) 
25. The Builder knew that the LDS Church did not build on the LDS Parcel 
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because of soil problems. The Builder also knew of the Delta report at the time of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement: 
Q: Okay. So it says, 'Seller to provide a copy of the soils report previously 
completed on this project.' You had been told that there had been a soils 
report on this project? 
A: (Mr. Simons) We knew that there they were relocated because they had 
found some collapsible soils. So we assumed that -
Q: So you knew of that report? 
A: Yes. 
(Rat 646.) 
26. One of the test holes dug for, and discussed in, the Delta report was about 30 
feet from the Homeowners' property. (R at 719, ^ | 31.) (See, Exhibit C).2 
27. The Builder knew that there was fill material on the Homeowners' Lot before 
building the House. (R at 713, ^  32.) 
28. The Builder never disclosed to any purchaser the fact that the LDS Church 
thought there was collapsible soil underlying the LDS Parcel. (R at 713, ^ f 33.) 
29. The Builder never disclosed to any purchaser the fact that the LDS Church had 
told the Builder there was a soil report indicating collapsible soil. (R at 713, ^ j 34.) 
30. The Builder never disclosed to the Homeowners at any time and in any way 
2
 Exhibit C shows the Homeowners' Lot (no. 304) touching the LDS Parcel, and 
the Delta Report test hole (in lot 205) which is 30 feet away from the Homeowners' lot. 
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the existence of, or the contents of: 
a. The Delta Engineering Report. 
b. The AGRA Report 
c. Any other type of written or verbal engineering reports from any time. 
(Rat 7144 35.) 
31. Further, the Builder never told the Homeowners that there were any soil issues 
of any kind associated with the property, even after the Homeowners complained to the 
Builder later about cracks in the foundation of the House. (R at 713, % 36.) 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court incorrectly held that there were no issues of fact regarding the 
Builder's knowledge of the collapsible soil underneath the Homeowners' Lot because (1) 
the Builder had knowledge of the existence of the Delta report via the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement it signed with the LDS Church, (2) and because it had knowledge of the 
contents of the Delta report from its purchase of the LDS Parcel. Such knowledge of the 
Delta Report means that the Builder has knowledge that the Delta Report discusses a test 
hole 30 feet from the Homeowners' Lot that contained deep collapsible soils. 
Further, the Builder admits it became aware of the contents of the Delta Report at 
the time of the Seawright litigation which was still before the Homeowners contacted the 
Builder with problems of foundational cracking. Thus, the Builder should have disclosed 
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its knowledge at that time to the Homeowners instead of assuring them that the cracking 
was normal and not a problem. 
Also, the trial court improperly weighed evidence by concluding that the Builder's 
soils engineer's conclusion that the Homeowners' Lot was suitable for construction 
controls over the data contained in the Delta and Agra reports. 
Finally, as a matter of law, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a claim for 
fraudulent concealment is inherently rife with factual issues and is thus a claim 
inappropriate for summary judgment. 
V. ARGUMENT 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary judgment 
unless the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." U.R.C.P. 
56(c). When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is 
not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide which side has the stronger case. Rather, the 
court's "sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. 
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
The nonmoving party is not required to "prove" its case in order to defeat a 
summary judgment motion. Rather, the nonmoving party is only required to submit 
evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 
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854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993). In addition, "If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party 
[and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." 
Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Finally, the nonmoving party's 
evidence is to be believed for purposes of the motion, and if there is a conflict in the 
evidence as to a material fact, the motion must be denied. See e^ , Draper City, 888 P.2d 
at 1100-01. 
Based on this standard, and the evidence presented below, disputed issues of fact 
preclude the trial court from granting the Builder's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. ISSUES OF FACT EXIST REGARDING WHETHER THE BUILDER 
KNEW OF THE COLLAPSIBLE SOILS IN AND AROUND THE 
HOMEOWNERS5 PROPERTY 
In granting the Builder's motion for summary judgment against the Homeowners' 
fraudulent non-disclosure claim, the trial court found that the "only issue in dispute is 
what knowledge Woodside [i.e. the Builder] had regarding collapsible soils on the 
Plaintiffs' [i.e. Homeowners] lot." (R at 900.) Knowledge is one of three elements the 
Homeowners are required to establish to prove fraudulent non-disclosure, and a 
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prerequisite to prove fraudulent concealment.3 Thus, for purposes of summary judgment, 
the trial court held that the existence of collapsible soils was material, and Woodside did 
not dispute that it had a legal duty to disclose such information. However, because the 
trial court found that the Builder had no knowledge of the non-disclosed information (i.e. 
collapsible soils beneath and around the Homeowners' Lot), it held that the Homeowners 
could not establish the knowledge requirement for the two fraud claims as a matter of 
law. This ruling by the trial court, however, is in error. 
A. The Builder Had Knowledge of the Existence of the Delta Report via 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement it Signed with the LDS Church 
A critical document in this litigation is the Delta Report, which Delta Geotechnical 
Consultants, Inc. drafted based on its soils investigation of the LDS Parcel. Based on the 
Delta Report, the LDS Church declined to build on its parcel of land, but rather sold it to 
the Builder Builder in 1992. (R at 716, ^ | 21.) This parcel of land is directly adjacent to 
the Homeowners' Lot. (See, map attached as Exhibit B). In fact, one of the test holes 
dug for (and discussed in) the Delta report was located approximately 30 feet from the 
3
 "To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff must prove the 
following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the 
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal 
duty to communicate." Hermansen v. Tasulis. 48 P.3d 235, 242 (Utah 2002) (emphasis 
added). Similarly, "[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or 
obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material 
facts known to him." McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
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Homeowners' property.4 (R at 669.) As the trial court already found there to be issues of 
fact regarding the materiality of the Delta Report, and the Builder does not dispute that it 
did not disclose the Delta Report to the Homeowners, the remaining issue is the Builder's 
knowledge of the collapsible soils underlying the Homeowners' lot and the property 
immediately adjacent thereto. 
The Builder claims that it did not have possession of the key Delta Report at the 
time the Homeowners purchased the Lot, and thus it had no knowledge of the collapsible 
soils 30 feet from the Homeowners' Lot: "It is undisputed that the Delta Report was not 
in Woodside's possession at the time Plaintiffs' purchased their house or at the time 
Plaintiffs complained about cracks." (R at 531.) However, in the same breath, the Builder 
admits that it knew that the LDS Church "decided to not build a large meetinghouse 
because of concerns about the soils." (R at 530.) Also, when the Builder purchased the 
LDS Parcel, the LDS Church informed the Builder that there were problems with the soil 
on the LDS Parcel. (R at 714, ^ 29.) Further, the Builder knew of the Delta report when 
it purchased the LDS Parcel. (R at 714, fflf 30-31.) The Builder knew that there was fill 
material on the Homeowners' Lot before building their House. (R at 713,1f 32.) Finally, 
the Builder never disclosed to any purchaser the fact that the LDS Church had told the 
4
 Exhibit B shows the Homeowners' lot (no. 304) touching the LDS Parcel, and the 
Delta Report test hole (in lot 205) which is 30 feet away from the Homeowners' lot. 
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Builder there was a soil report indicating collapsible soil. (R at 713, ^ f 34.) 
Additionally, the Builder has indicated its knowledge of the existence of the Delta 
Report. For example, prior to the LDS Church selling the LDS Parcel to the Builder, the 
LDS Church engaged Delta to conduct a soils test on the LDS Parcel. The report of said 
soils test is the Delta Report. Attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement which 
governed the Builder's purchase of the LDS Parcel, are excerpts of the Delta Report.5 
(See, Exhibit C). The Builder's agent, Vice-President Simons, undisputedly signed the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement (which he drafted) on behalf of the Builder. Just above 
the signature of "J. Bradley Simons, Vice President Woodside Homes Corporation" on 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, it states: "Seller to provide a copy of the soils report 
[i.e. the Delta Report] previously completed on the property prior to closing." (See, 
Exhibit C attached hereto). 
Further, Mr. Simons even admitted that he knew of the Delta Report at the time of 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement: 
5
 Mr. Livingstone, the LDS Church's real estate agent for this transaction 
explained that the reason he included the Delta Report with the purchase contract was 
because he: 
wanted to disclose the condition of the soils for construction purposes. We found 
it unsuitable for our construction purposes and I was aware that Woodside would 
be developing and constructing on the site and so we wanted them to be fully 
aware of the soils conditions they purchased, so that there would be no liability 
coming back subsequent to the sale. 
(Rat 715,H26.) 
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Q: Okay. So it says,' Seller to provide a copy of the soils report previously 
completed on this project.5 You had been told that there had been a soils 
report on this project? 
A: We knew that there they were relocated because they had found some 
collapsible soils. So we assumed that -
Q: So you knew of that report? 
A: Yes. 
(R at 646.) Nevertheless, Mr. Simons responds to the attached excerpts, the disclosure 
language just above the signature block, and his own admission that he knew of the Delta 
Report at the time of the Builder's sales agreement with the LDS Church, by claiming 
that for some reason he just didn't read the excerpts of the Delta Report attached to the 
Earnest Money Sale Agreement. And thus the Builder claims no knowledge of the Delta 
Report at the time it contracted with the Homeowners. In other words, just because the 
Builder supposedly chose not to read the Delta Report given to it in a variety of ways, it 
had no knowledge. Such an argument certainly leads to the perverse incentive for people 
or entities to disclaim knowledge of damning documents they might possess or receive by 
simply claiming, ;I received it but I didn't actually read it.' At the very least, however, an 
issue of fact exists as to whether the Builder read the Delta Report or not. 
Aside from the factual issue regarding whether the Builder had knowledge of the 
contents, the law certainly presumes the Builder had knowledge of the contents of the 
attached excerpts to the purchase contract. In Semenov v. Hill 1999 Utah 58, U 12, the 
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court held: "The general rule pertaining to acceptance of an offer by signing is that 'where 
a person signs a document, he is not permitted to show that he did not know its terms, and 
in the absence of fraud or mistake he will be bound by all its provisions, even though he 
has not read the agreement and does not know its contents.'" (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts 
§§ 41(f) (1963)).6 Further, signing and executing a contract imputes knowledge to the 
signor of the contents thereof. Jacobson v. Cox. 202 P.2d 714, 721 (Utah 1949) (holding 
that the plaintiff "signed and executed the contract as one of the parties and is [thus] 
charged with knowledge of its contents." 
Accordingly, although the Homeowners assert that the Builder had knowledge of 
the existence of the Delta Report (and thus its contents) before it contracted with the 
Homeowners and built their House, at the very least, issues of fact exist regarding the 
Builder's knowledge of the Delta Report thereby precluding summary judgment. 
B. Issues of Fact Exist Regarding the Builder's Knowledge of the Contents 
of the Delta Report From its Purchase of the LDS Parcel 
Issues of fact also exist as to whether the Builder had knowledge of the contents of 
the Delta Report. Mr. Simons testified in his deposition that when the Builder purchased 
the LDS Parcel, the LDS Church informed the Builder that there were problems with the 
6
 Similarly, by recording a deed at a county recorder's office, the public is put on 
notice not just of the existence of the deed, but of the contents of the deed. U.C.A.§ 17-
21-11(1). 
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soil on the LDS Parcel. (R at 644.) Also, the Builder knew that the LDS Church did not 
build on the LDS Parcel because of soil problems. 14 And in fact, one of the test holes 
dug for (and discussed in) the Delta report was about 30 feet from the Homeowners' 
property. (R at 669.) And, as stated above, the Builder knew that the LDS Church 
"decided to not build a large meetinghouse because of concerns about the soils." It 
cannot now simply claim that it knew about the collapsible soils nearby the Homeowners' 
Lot, but didn't think the collapsible soil was that serious. The issue is, did the Builder 
know. According to its then-Vice President Brad Simons, it knew. 
Mr. Livingstone, LDS agent, provides further evidence that the Builder had 
knowledge of the contents of the Delta Report. He testified that he caused a copy of the 
Delta Report at be given to the Builder at the time of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement: 
Q: Do you know if they [the Builder] were given a copy of [the Delta 
Report]? 
A: I do. They were given that. 
Q: At the time of this sale, roughly? 
A: Yes. 
(R at 625-26.) The Builder, of course, maintains that it never saw a copy of the Delta 
Report until the Seawright litigation in 1995-1996, thereby implying that it never received 
the copy Mr. Livingstone had sent. Nevertheless, whether they received it or not is a 
factual issue inappropriate for summary judgment. 
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At the very least, an issue of fact regarding the Builder's knowledge precludes the 
Court from deciding this issue. 
C. Pursuant to the Seawright Litigation, the Builder Had Knowledge of 
the Contents of the Delta Report Before the Homeowners' First 
Complaints in 1997 to the Builder 
The Builder, through its Vice-President Mr. Simons, claims it did not know of the 
contents in the Delta Report until its litigation with the Seawrights (a couple in a lot 
adjacent to the LDS Parcel and nearby the Homeowners' Lot. In April of 1995, the 
Seawrights first complained to the Builder of foundational cracking. (R at 719, f^ 5.) In 
October of 1995, the Builder hired AGRA to inspect the Seawrights' property. On 
October 6, 1995, the Builder's Vice President (at the time) Brad Simons wrote the 
Seawrights a letter telling them that AGRA discovered collapsible soils two to three feet 
thick underlying the Seawrights' house, and in an October 25,1995 letter, Mr. Simons 
discusses piering the Seawrights' house to remedy the settling problem. (R at 719, ^  6.) 
Presumably, the Seawrights' litigation with the Builder was sometime around the time of 
this letter. 
Compare the timing of the Seawrights' litigation with the Homeowners' discovery 
of foundational cracking with their House. On September 27, 1995 the Homeowners 
closed on the House. (R at 720, \ 2.) Beginning in 1996 and into 1997, the Homeowners 
noticed cracks in the foundation of the House, the basement floor and the driveway. (R at 
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719, Tf 3.) Doors throughout the House had shifted and were hard to open and close. The 
Homeowners informed the Builder in 1997 who, after their own inspection, told the 
Homeowners to "Don't worry about cracks, these are normal." The Builder was "100% 
sure" of this. IcL 
This chronology is important because the Builder claims that the first time it saw a 
copy of the Delta Report, and thus became aware of its contents, was "during the 
Seawright lawsuit." (R at 646.) The Seawright lawsuit was clearly before the 
Homeowners complained of foundational cracking to the Builder in 1997. Thus, by its 
own admission the Builder knew of the Delta Report, and had even conducted its own 
soils investigation of the neighboring Seawright lot (i.e. the AGRA Report), but failed to 
disclose such information to the Homeowners when they began complaining of problems 
identical to the Seawrights.7 
Thus, even if the Court finds that the Builder had no knowledge of the existence or 
contents of the Delta Report at the time the Builder entered into the Agreement with the 
Homeowners, the Builder certainly had such knowledge by 1997 when the Homeowners 
began complaining of foundational cracking. Accordingly, the Builder's failure to 
7
 Such a disclosure would have allowed the Homeowners to mitigate their damages 
in 1997, rather than wait five more years till 2002 when they tried selling the House. It 
would have allowed them to conduct discovery into the circumstances of the collapsible 
soils underlying their house when memories and reports were most recent, available, and 
fresh. 
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disclose the existence and/or contents of the Delta Report (or the AGRA Report for that 
matter) as of 1997, while informing the Homeowners that it was "100% sure" that the 
cracks were "normal," was fraudulent, and precluded summary judgment of the 
Homeowners' fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent concealment claims. 
In sum, factual disputes exist regarding the Builder's knowledge of the existence 
and content of the Delta Report, which, if known to the Builder, discloses deep 
collapsible soils 30 feet from the Homeowners' House. 
D. The Trial Court Improperly Weighed Evidence By Concluding that the 
Builder's Soils Engineer's Conclusion that the Homeowners' Lot Was 
Suitable for Construction Controlled Over Conflicting Data Contained 
in the Delta and AGRA Reports 
The trial court concluded that the Builder had no knowledge about the collapsible 
soils underneath the Homeowners' Lot, primarily because the Builder's soils engineer, 
Mr. Gordon, indicated to Woodside that the Homeowners' Lot was suitable for 
construction. (R at 899-900.) The trial court's decision thus implies that the Builder's 
soils engineer's testimony controls over conflicting data contained in the Delta and 
AGRA reports. However, in coming to this conclusion, the trial court compared and 
weighed Mr. Gordon's testimony against the Delta and AGRA reports, which is 
inappropriate for summary judgment. As stated above, when a court addresses a motion 
for summary judgment, the court's function is not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide 
which side has the stronger case, rather the court's "sole inquiry should be whether 
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material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 
(Utah 1995). 
Accordingly, concluding that Mr. Gordon's testimony controls over the Delta and 
AGRA reports is nothing more than an impermissible weighing of evidence. Thus, the 
Court's award of summary judgment should be reversed. 
IL THE HOMEOWNERS5 FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT CAUSE OF 
ACTION 
Similar to its disposition of the Homeowners' fraudulent non-disclosure cause of 
action, the trial court summarily dismissed the Homeowners' fraudulent concealment 
cause of action because the Builder "had no knowledge of the possibility of remaining 
collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot." (R at 899.) The trial court's decision, however, 
ignores Utah caselaw holding that fraudulent concealment claims are inherently rife with 
factual issues that preclude summary judgment. In Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 
327, 333 (Utah 1997) the Utah Supreme Court found the determination of fraudulent 
concealment to be a factual one, precluding summary judgment: 
The application of this legal rule [of fraudulent concealment] to any particular set 
of facts is necessarily a matter left to trial courts and finders of fact We 
explicitly acknowledge that weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct 
in light of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action necessitates the type 
of factual findings which preclude summary judgment in all but the clearest of 
cases. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only when the facts fall on two 
opposite ends of a factual continuum: either (i) when the facts are so clear that 
reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the 
application of the governing legal standard to the facts or (ii) when the facts 
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underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or 
insufficiently established that they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
concealment, with the result that the claim fails as a matter of law. 
(Emphasis added). The trial court never found that the facts underlying the allegation of 
fraudulent concealment were so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that they fail 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Furthermore, by its very nature, fraudulent 
concealment (and, by extension, its cousin fraudulent non-disclosure) are highly fact-
sensitive claims, inappropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, dismissal of the 
Homeowners' fraudulent concealment cause of action as a matter of law constitutes 
reversible error. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Homeowners request that the Court of Appeals 
overturn the trial court's award of summary judgment by finding that issues of fact exist 
regarding the Builder's knowledge, and remand this case to trial. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U \ day of February, 2004 1/ (
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUT/Z, L.C. 
Stephen^uesenberry 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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EXHIBIT "A 
PURPOSE AGREEMENT AND DEPOSI" RECEIPT 
Th i s Is a lega l l y b i n d i n g con t rac t . If y o u des i re legal or tax adv i se , c o n t a c t y o u r a t t o rney o r t ax adv i so r . 
1 This agreements made and entered into by and between Woodside Homes, Corporation, a Utah corporation ("SELLER-), and £\LI S , 
(Collectively "BUYER") whose address 
i s ' [ * y f t ( ' < g > Q - ^ g & _ j E > 0(2&\{\JU. * ^ ^ o i w # 4 0 - / 3 ^ / work phone *>n \ - ? * r W . work 
phone , for the purchase of certain real property located at ^ 4 ^ & £ 3 / ^ T > KL . also known 
as Lot f^P'ot PfrKl0-(lAf*Ji-fetrX/ffeubdiviston, entered into this_ — day of /##/£jajffgT^hlch real property shall in-
clude improvements erected thereon in accordance with plan P&AWJj U J « L - . elevation fir .and options as specified on addendum 
*A" The lot and improvements shall hereinafter bo referred to as the 'Property*. Seller acknowledges receipt from BUYER of the Deposit 
in the form of Cash ( ), Check (*^TOther ( ), which shaH apply to the purchase of said 
Property. 
BUYER intends to purchase said Property as a primary residence ( ^ secondary residence ( ), non-owner occupied investment property ( }. 
2 DETAILS OF PURCHASE. BUYER agrees to pay SELLER for the Property the Total Purchase Price set forth below, to be paid in cash at dosing 
In the eventthat BUYER is successful in qualifying for and obtaining the financing contemplated by BUYER, BUYER'S estimated monetary obligations at close 
of escrow will be: 
Base Pnce $ ' / ' < & Total Purchase Price $ ISP CttC\ 
Total Options From Addendum "A* $ _ Payment • "~? &C>& 
Total Purchase Price $ -F^^j 7**& Loan Amount = / * " » ^ M 5 * ~ * ^ 
l&**\H ^ Estimated Closing Costs +f / / g L ~ 7 J 
ffutj&l tdeA* 15Dy CDO
 Estimated Jmpounds forTaxeS| X / 7 o o 
H) Insurance, etc V > * J»/ 
Total Estimate of Cash Required « 
P F f . F t V E D Deposit Paid Herewith - Sl&O 
Start Deposit - jj Q&& 
tfAR 1 3 1995 dan a 
1
 Estimate of Additional Cash - , T T f 7 V Required at or Prior to Close 
SELLER acknowledges receipt of deposit stated above BUYER understands, acknowledges and agrees that SELLER may retain this and all subsequent 
deposits in its possession outside of escrow until or through closing. BUYER agrees that SELLER may utilize said deposits but shall in no manner be liable 
to BUYER for any Interest earned on said deposits. 8UYER agrees to deposit additional funds with SELLER as follows 
Pay the sum of f v Q g - p M n l c f e A M n 7 / r g ( S v S c ? o ^ ) additional deposit on orbefore A P & l l — 11 19 9 S ^ 
BUYER understands and acknowledges that aside from the Base Price, Optional I terns, and Total Purchase Price, the costs andpayments set forth above 
are estimates only. and shoutd actual costs exceed those estimates, BUYER agrees to bear that excess. BUYER understands and acknowledges that BUYER 
will or may have to fund impounds at closing for future taxes and fire and extended coverage insurance and will or may incur costs for an appraisal, credit 
report, loan inspection fee, loan origination fee, tax service, recording fees, escrow fees, mortgage insurance and other escrow and financing related fees 
and costs which are estimated above. BUYER agrees to pay those costs and fees at dosing. 
3 FINANCING BUYER'S initials shall indicate the provisions which shall apply to this agreement. 
a K / A—, BUYER shall pay cash without financing to complete the purchase of the Property, and agrees within 7 calendar days from 
date ot this agreement to provide SELLER with evidence satisfactory to SELLER that sufficient cash is available to complete this purchase 
SELLER agrees to a cash discount of M-f^ % of the purchase price (no discount on options). This discount has been reflected in the 
base price shown in Section 2. . v * 
b ) ^ g l ~ f f v V BUYER shall obtain an FHA , VA Conventional. )C loan from Z.\fTM<^ /nC/&~t (Approved lender), to 
/
 "complete the" purchase of the Property, Buyer agrees within *7 , calendar days from the date of this agreement to make application for 
a loan and withm ^fO days to provide SELLER with evidence of unconditional loan approval 
c jM / j i y - BUY5R will sell BUYER'S present property which is located at kJj££K~ 
in order to complete tho purchase of the Property. If already sold, closing is scheduled r V y ^ w - at / V / / t — title 
company BUYER agrees within f j / A - days to provide SELLER with evidence that BUYER'S property has been s6\d^d scheduled 
to close soon enough to permit BUYERS complete this purchase BUYER understands and agrees that SELLER will continue to solicit offers 
on the property from other parties Should SELLER receive another otter, SELLER shall notify BUYER and BUYER shall have 3 calendar days 
after such a notification to sell BUYER s present proporty and provide to SELLER satisfactory evidence of BUYER'S ability to complete the 
purchase of the property Should BUYER fail to so perform, BUYER'S deposit less any costs already incurred by SELLER or Lender for credit 
and appraisal reports, escrow fees or loan processing fees shall be returned to BUYER and BUYER shall have no further rights to purchase 
the property. 
Should BUYER fail to provide SELLER with satisfactory evidence in a timely manner according to the provisions of this Section, of (a) cash 
necessary to complete the transaction, (b) prompt loan submission and unconditional loan approval, or (c) sale and dosing of presenthome, 
BUYER shall be in a material breach of contract and the terms ot Section 1&-DEFAULT, shall apply 
4. INTEREST RATES ANO LOCKS Interest rates fluctuate an a daily basis. BUYER therefore acknowledges thatthe rate at closing may be higher, lower, 
or the same as that which is available at the time this agreement is executed. BUYER acknowledges that any information solicited from SELLER or its affiliates 
or agents concerning future interest rate levels, points, orwhether it is prudent to lock-m a rate is purely opinion and BUYER hereby agrees to hold these parties 
harmless from any loss or action which may occur from basing financial decisions on satd opinions. 
BUYER agrees that any lock-in of an interest rate with lender is done entirely at BUYER'S own risk and discretion. BUYER agrees to hold harmless 
SELLER and any of its agent or representatives if final completion extends beyond any lock-in period that BUYE R may negotiate with the Lender. Any estimate 
of a possible completion date solicited for the purpose of ascertaining a lock-in period, arranging for the move, giving a landlord notice, or for any other purpose 
shall be and is understood by BUYER to be only an estimate and shall not serve to modify the delivery provisions contained in Section 6 of this Agreement 
5 CONSTRUCTION The house is, or will be, constructed on the Property substantially in conformity with the plans, specifications, and change orders 
on file and available for inspection at the main office of SELLER. Model homes, when available reflect the typical floor plans, workmanship, and methods of 
construction, and illustrate possibilities for future interior decoration ad extenor landscaping However, houses will not necessanly conform to the model homes 
and will not include decorator items, special mirror or wall treatments, special land&caping, patios, pool, special exterior treatments, drapes, or upgraded floor 
coverings or tiles SELLER reserves and shall have the nght to make any changes or substitutions in the construction, matenal, fixtures, method or other 
integral part oi anything to be contained in the Property. 
CHANGES BY SELLER. BUYER understands that the house Is not being custom built for BUYER (except as indicated on the Addendum A executed 
concurrently with this Contract and made a part hereof by this reference) Rather, the House Is one in a planned development which will contain many similar 
or identical houses. SELLER shall have the nght to maKe such reasonable changes in the plans and specifications and in materials and locations as do not 
violate applicable federal, state or local law and. to the extant applicable. FHA and VA rules and regulations 
Lot preparation is at the sole discretion ol SELLER and SELLER has at its sole and complete discretion the method and manner of preparation, including 
the removal of any trees, shrubs, bushes, cacti, or other natural growth, and at no time may SELLER, its agents or subcontractors be liable to BUYER in 
exercising discretion in lot preparation Further, BUYER acknowledges that he has not relied and will not rely upon the verbal representations of the SELLER 
or us agents relating to lot preparation and the location of improvements on the tot. 
Lot grading shall be/has been performed according to FHA/VA or the governing municipality's specifications to assure proper drainage. SELLER shall 
not be responsible for damage caused by BUYER'S alterations of lotgrades. Builder will notprovide retention between sloped lots unless specifically contracted 
as part of this Agreement BUYER will work with neighbors in providing necessary retention. 
BUYER understands that a construction site is a very dangerous place to visit SELLER strongly urges buyer to keep away from the property until after 
closing Should buyer enter the Property prior to closing, BUYER agrees to indemnify, defend and hold SELLER harmless from any cost expense or liability 
arising, directly or indirectly, out of or in connsctton with said entry. Including but not limited to physical injury OT death Buyer may be asked to leave job site 
by seller 
6 COMPLETION In the event that the Residence has not been constructed as of the effective date of this Agreement, SELLER agrees to take reasonable 
steps to have the Residence fully constructed within six (S) months of the issuance ot the building permit from the local governing authority. SELLER shall 
request the permits be issued as SELLER'S schedule and manpower allow. The specific date on which a permit, approved by the citv is actuaiiv K*mvt a*rf 
at tho time of final inspection but a certificate of occupancy 15 issued BUYER shall accept the Property and complete the purchase 
If for any reason whatsoever, except SELLER s willful default SELLER shall be unable to complete the construction of the dwelling and to deliver title 
within twelve (12) months of the date of this Agreement in accordance with the provisions herein It is agreed that SELLER 5 liability shall be limited to the 
return of payments made by BUYER and upon the return to BUYER of said sum this Agreement shall be null and void and the parties mutually released 
with no resultant liability of either party If a national or limited emergency creates a condition whereby SELLER is forced to incur costs greater than present 
est mates SELLER shall have the option of raising the selling price by the amount of such increased costs and BUYER shall then have the option of paying 
th© sum of the additional emergency costs or receiving a refund of his deposit 
7 INSPECTION BY BUYER BUYER represents that he is of legal age that he has inspected the Property and the plans and specifications or model 
house and that the Property is and has been purchased by 8U Y£R solely as the result of such inspection The House shall have no extras or additions not 
as set forth in the standard plane and specifications for said House except as set forth m Addendum A and any Addendums thereto SELLER HAS MADE 
NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES TO BUYER WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH IN THIS CONTRACT By closing escrow on the 
Property BUYER acknowledges that the Property conforms to the terms and specifications of this Contract 
8 OCCUPANCY At closing, the entire purchase pnee less any deposits retained by SELLER, shall be delivered to SELLER ma cashier's check Tide 
to the Property shall be conveyed to BUYER subject to assessments recorded covenants conditions restrictions easements nght-of way subsurface 
grants reservations and nghts of and to water oil gas or any other minerals and hydro carbon substances 
Signing of closing or loan documents does not mean that title has passed from SELLER to BUYER Title passes and possession is allowed when closing 5 
completed and the deed has bean recorded until then the Property belongs to SELLER 
9 SELECTION OF COLORS BUYER shall make all selections of colors styles and patterns relating to the dwelling and pay for all optional or upgrade 
items selected prior to startof construction except that BUYER shall not be entitled to change any item which has already been selected by SELLER If BUYER 
does not make all such selections within this time frame SELLER shall at its option (a) make such selections in which event BUYER hereby agrees to accept 
SELLERS selections or (b) treat this failure to make selection as a material breach of the contract and proceed according to the terms of Section 11 DEFA ULT 
10 CUSTOMIZATION BUYER shall not prior to closing install or caused to be installed by BUYER S contractors or subcontractors custom vanations 
to the home without prior written consent from SELLER Any such customizations installed without prior wntten permission from SELLER shall be removed 
replaced and or repaired by SELLER at the expense of BUYE R BUYER hereby agrees to pay any and all such cost within five (5) days of receiving an itemized 
statement from SELLER BUYER SHALL NOT PLACE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE HOME WITHOUT THE PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF SELLER 
11 INSULATION The home has been or will be insulated as follows 
R Value of Insulation Thickness 
Exteror walls of living area (excluding garage) 
Ceiling area 
Second Story Projections over garage and exterior f-\ 0?fcJ2JrnLJvZ'> Q - / *9 /& * 
12 DEFAULT In the event the BUYER fails to consummate this transaction or otherwise breaches any abligatan of this Agreement SELLER may 
terminate the transaction and SELLER * further obligation to BUYER under this Agreement in which case the parties by placing their initials below agree 
the SELLERS damages will be substantial but extremely difficult to ascertain and that all deposits then pa,*) t ^ E L L E R as set forth in Section 2 of this 
Agreement shall constitute a reasonable estimate of those damages QiA- ^&/H\ 
/ B U Y E R [initials SELLER & In 
Should dispute anse between the parties hereto with respect to any of the foregoing SELLER sraflfbe entitled to hold and retain any and all deposits 
and other sums m iis possession until resolution of such dispute 
13 FHA AND VA LOANS If BUYER is purchasing the property with a loan guaranteed by FHA or VA it is expressly agreed that notwithstanding any 
other provisions of this Agreement the BUYER shall not incur any penalty by forfeiture of deposit or be obligated to complete the purchase of the Property 
if the purchase pnee of the Property exceeds the appraised value of the Property for mortgage insurance purpose by FHA or Reasonable Value established 
by VA The 8UYER shall however have the pnvilege and option of proceeding with the consummation of this contract wi thou tregard to the amount of the 
FHA appraisal or VA Reasonable Value 
BUYER and SELLER acknowledge that if BUYER qualifies for an FHA or VA loan Lender may reauire SELLER to pay a FHA or VA loan discount fee 
SELLER shall not be obliged to pay a loan discount fee which aycaoric ^//^ —nornont f ^ / > > - %) of the principal amount of the loan If at the 
t me of issuance of the certificate of occupancy discounted points do exceed [4"t / ^ - . % SELLEH may terminate this Agreement If VA is guaranteeing 
BUYER s loan SELLER s damages for BUYER'S broach of the Agreement shall be as specified in the VA Addendum If FHA is insuring BUYER s loan then 
the damages described in paragraph 11 shall apply
 / / 
14 CONVENTIONAL LOANS SELLER shall pay loan discount fees not to exceed * t / A - — ' percent ( /V /9r^%) of the pnncipal amount of 
the loan Said discount fees shall be used exclusively for loan fees associated with a specific interest rate 7 
15 ADJACENT PROPERTY BUYER acknowledges that SELLER presently plans to develop only those units which have alroady boon roloasod for 
•ale and construction and has no obligation w th respect to future plans zon ng and development of real property in the area of Property BUYER understands 
that proposed and contemplated residential and other developments may have been illustrated on a plot plan or other sales literature of SELLER However 
notwithstanding any othcroral discussions or representations by sales personnel or otherwise SELLER is under no obligation to construct such developments 
and BUYER should not and s not in any way relying upon the presumption that the same will be constructed by SELLER BUYER understands that no sales 
person or any other person in any way associated with SELLER has any authority to make any statement contrary to the provisions of th s paragraph BUYER 
understands that SELLER does not guarantee the existence of any view for the Property BUYER al6o understands that electric transformers duster 
mailboxes telephone boxes and/or cable boxes may be located on the property and may not be installed until shortly before or after close of escrow 
16 HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (a) BUYER is aware that his membership in the Subd vision homeowner s association is required an d BUYER 
agrees to abide by the Articles of Incorporation By Laws and rules and Regulations of the Association BUYER is further aware that the Property shall be 
subject to assessments levied by the association and described in full in the Declaration of Covenants Conditions and Restrictions for the subd vision BUYER 
acknowledges receipt of copie^ of the Articles of Incorporation and By Laws for the Associaton R C C C I V T 0 
A / / ^ " BUYERS s Initials (initial only if applicable to this purchase) 
(b) BUYER acknowledges receipt of a copy of the subdivision Declaration of Covenants Conditions and Restnctions
 r 
_ _ _ BUY£R s Initials (initials only if applicable to this purchase) M r\Q } J 139^ 
17 ASSIGNMENT PROHIBITION BUYER may not assign sell transferor hypothecate this Agreement nor his nghfe therein contained without the pr or 
written consent of SELLER 
18 TIME OF ESSENCE Time «s of the essence in the performance of the terms of this AgreemenL 
19 WAIVER AND SEVERABILITY The waiver by the SELLER of any term condition or provision of this Agreement shall not be construed as a waiver 
ol any other or subsequent term condition or provision In the event that any portion of this Agreement shad be declared by any court of competent junsdiction 
to be invalid illegal or unenforceable such portion shall be deemed severed from this Agreement and the remaining portions hereof shall remain tn full force 
and effect as fully as though such Inval d illegal or unenforceable portion had never been part of this Agreement 
20 LIMITED ONE YEAR WARRANTY SELLER warrants that all work performed by Seller tn connection with the construction of the House will be of 
a quality which is standard m the industry in the State of Utah In conformance with requirements of the Utah State Division of Contractors Seller guarantees 
all such work against defective workmanship and materials for a period of one (1) year from the date of closing Seller dunng normal business hours and 
at its own expense will make any and all necessary repa rs or replacements provided such repairs or replacements are necessary as a result of defect ve 
workmanship or materials and provided Seller is granted reasonable access to the property dunng said normal business hours Sellers obligations under 
this warranty and under this contract are limited to repair or replacement No steps taken by Seller to correct defects shall extend the warranty penod beyond 
the one (1) year penod This warranty ts applicable only to matters reported in writing to SELLER before the oxptration of the one (1) year penod SELLER 
ni3kes no warranty or representation hereunder es to the presence or non-presence of radon or other naturally occurring hazardous environmental conditions 
or to the ef'ec s of any such condition en the Property or Buy* TH S WARRANTY iS THE ONLi WARRANT APPLICABLE TO TH'S °URC fASE ALL 
OTHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND HABITABILITY AND 
WORKMANSHIP INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED TO 
COVER THE PRESENCE OF RADON OR OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS WHICH EXCEEDTHE FOREGOING OBLIGATIONS ARE HEREBY 
DISCLAIMEDANDTHESAME ARE EXCLUDED FROMTHIS CONTRACT This warranty is intended to protect BUYER from faulty construction and defective 
materials used in the construction of the House and does not apply to defects caused by way of example and not as a limitation by normal wear and tear 
insubstantial variance or defects the elements natural disasters or other acts or events beyond the control of SELLER or faulty maintenance operation or 
abusive use Notwithstanding the foregoing SELLERS warranty shall in no event extend to any consumer product appliances air conditioning units fumacos 
and water heaters and other products included irHtys transaction The manufacturers of some products used in the House may provide manufacturers 
warranty SELLER has no obligation or responsibility for the manufacturer s performance and SELLER does not warrant any of these items for any other 
purpose If a manufacturer s warranty has been issued to SELLER SELLER hereby assigns to BUYER to be effective upon Cloa ng without recourse to 
SELLER all rights uodar said manufacturer s warranties as are assignable on appliances and any other consumer products included in the House 
BUYER UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT SELLERS LIABILITY WHETHER IN CONTRACT OR OTHERWISE IS LIMITED TO THE REMEDY OF 
REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT, WHICH REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT IS SELLERS OPTION AS SET FORTH ABOVE UNDER NO CIRCUM-
STANCES SHALL SELLER BE LfABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY 
DAMAGES BASED ON A CLAIMED DIMINUTION IN THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY NO ACTION REGARDLESS OF FORM A R I S I N G n i i r n c 
THE TRANSACTION UNnpn TWIQ P H M T O A P T » A V QC o n « .~ ^ ~ -
' SELLER IN THE PROCESS OF REMEDY OF 
k r / WHETHER SUCH ACTION IS EFFECTED ON 
OCCURRED UNDER THE WARRANTY fc-^\»ISIONS HEREINABOVE PROVIDED. NO ACTION-
A GIVEN CLAIM OF WARRANTY SHALL fcif TO MODIFY THE CONDITIONS OF THIS WARRAV 
BEHALF OF BUYER OR A THIRD PARTY. SELLER SHALL HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR'ANY CLAIM THAT IS REPAIRED BY BUYER WITH-
OUT BEING SUBMITTED IN WRITING TO SELLER AND ALLOWING SELLER REASONABLE TIME TO EFFECT SUCH REPAIR OR REPLACE-
MENT AS MAY BE REQUIRED AS PER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS WARRANTY. 
This dwelling will be Insured by a nationally recognized warranty/insurance company. BUYER, by initialling below, acknowledges and agrees: (a) that he 
has received and reviewed the specimen capias of the Buyer's Protection Plan documents; (b) That the "Approved Standards" as set forth In the 
Protection Plan documents shall be the sole and exclusive standards applicable to the dwelling with the exception that the standards as set forth by the 
Utah Department of Contractors shall prevail if \n conflict with the "Approved Standards* as set forth in the protection Plan documents; (c) that in the 
event of any warranty claim of any kind BUYER will have no right to sue SELLER unless and until BUYER has filed a complaint with SELLER, in writing 
to the SELLER'S main office Located at 127 South 500 East #600, SLC, Utah 84102, and followed other claim procedures as set forth in the "Protection 
Plan" documents including procedures requiring informal dispute settlements; (d) That the provisions of this section shall apply notwithstanding any 
provisions to the contrary in any other documents; and (e) that this section may be amended or modified only by written agreement between SELLER/ 
BUYER that specifically states an intention to modify or amend the provisions, of ,this section. 
BUYER'S INITIALS t X ^ V T ) ( ) 
21. APPLICABLE LAW AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. The laws of the State of l/iah shall govern the validity, construction, performance and effect of this 
Agreement. In the event that legal action is instituted by any party hereto with respect to the rights or obligations of any party to this Agreement, the prevailing 
party in such action shall be entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party its reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit to be determined by the Court 
in such action. 
22. NOTICE. Any notices provided for in this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be doomed given when either hand delivered (in the case of BUYE R) 
to any party comprising BUYER or (In tho case of SELLER) to a person of reasonable age and discretion at S^LLFR's general offices. Likewise any such 
notice shall be deemed delivered seventy-two (72) hours after the same is deposited in the mail to (In case of BUYER) BUYER'S current address as noted 
in this Agreement or Jin the case of SELLER) to SELLER'S general offices as reflected in the then-current telephone directory for Salt Lake County. 
23. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. BUYER hereby represents BUYER is not relying upon any warranties, promises, guarantees, or representations made by 
SELLER or anyone acting or claiming to act on behalf of SELLER unless reduced to writing and made a part of this Agreement. This Agreement constitutes 
the entire agreement and understanding be'tween BUYER and SELLER with respect to purchase of the dwelling and cannot be amended, changed, modified 
or supplemented except by an instrument in writing signed by both parties. This Agreement supersedes all prior written and oral understandings between 
BUYER and SELLER. 
24. ACCEPTANCE. This offer may be accepted only by an authorized officer or agent of SELLER. 
25. OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS. The parties comprising BUYER acknowledge that they have read an understand the terms and conditions set 
forth in this Agreement, received a copy thereof, and agree to the purchase of the Property atlhe price and on the terms and conditions noted herein regardless 
of any oral statement which may have been made by BUYER to the contrary. 
26. BUYER agrees that if a cancellation is effected after plans have been redrawn by Woodside Homes, BUYER will forfeit that portion ot the deposit 
which covers costs of such work. Builder reserves the right to redraw or modify plans based on the options and changes that BUYER has chosen. 
27. BUYER acknowledges that all plans, plot plans, and specifications must be submitted to an Architectural Control Committee, a Local Government 
Authority and Woodside Homes Construction Department for approval. BUYER hereby agrees to acceptall necessary modification to drawings and plot plan 
that may be required to comply with these agencies and departments. AH needed changes will be reviewed and accepted by BUYER. Additional expenses 
incurred shall be borne by BUYER. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS OR AGREEMENTS: 
i F » 4 r t » l . £ _ w * A L c V T d X P n p ; g L T f c p A ^ « w r * W J ? / A.C pA&AJCfjfZAPhh ( V } %-QLL^/Z-
J^lur P^4—fty^fc/ZA '*&& / D A y P£*tAurf Ifr frr<? Dao^y. 
I have fully read and understand this Agreement. I offer to purchase the 
property subject to the terms and conditions herein. I understand this offer is 
not a binding contract and SELLER has no obligation until this contract is 




Receipt of the deposit specified above is hereby acknowledged and 
presentation of this offer to SELLER i s being made by: 
DATE 
jai l 
Q y > h C&zyu 
SALES AGENT REPRESENTING 
WOODSIDE HOMES - SELLER 
B, CNJ personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all 
signatures to be mailed on lflfl$A'.ChlFl. l o f f i ^ . by Certified Mail 
and return attached hereto to the D Contractor OXBuyer. Sent By JfiA^1 
RF.CEIVE0 
H6F \ 3 1995 
EXHIBIT "B" 
I^lilTW' 
^ S l ^ ^^%^^^ 
» - , .
 fc . . - > v / . | j ! v s i K*^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ '^ 
|WU)b G W M *HW ^ ^ S " , S W"Z- W^-it i ^rtfS")' 
62^02/96 08:38 KMA ARCHITECTS 002 
EXHIBIT "C" 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, BLAINE T. LIVINGSTON have reviewed the Earnest Money Agreement to Sell and 
Addendum to Earnest Money Agreement to Sell and know their contents. I am informed and 
believe to the best of my knowledge that the attached copies of said documents are true and 
correct copies of the originals. 
Executed on May ^ 7 , 1997 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
y^pj^^tTi 
BLAINE T. LIVINGSTON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Z 7 day of May_, 1997. 
NOTARY PUBLIC / v V , ~ 
Residing a t : . ^ / / / ^ / / " fl^kf . Ul 




fsnd '' Yas<X) ^ No(O) 
VHNEST MONEY SALES AGREEME 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE: Anril o, 199? 
ho undersigned Buyej 
EARNEST MONEY, the amount o( 
ha farm of 
kerage 
Woodside Homes Corporation, a Utah Corporation .
 t j 
— L . u , . — . — hereby daposits with Brokarac 
F I E R Hundred and no/IQQ ri^lnfM ^OCUUQ " 
^r^T-o nhpn1/ fn_hp rionrv; t fl&H npnn aocp;;.rj:£ir)pe o f o f fer 
.... . . . . . . . ;_-..-.# K//' 






f 3.BBradlay. Simons, Vice President 
• / . / 
OFFER TO PURCHAS~ 
. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above staled EARNEST MONEY Is givci 
c* F v M M h «»fl" _ in the City of _ _ M n d o i 1 
;n to sec 
i / 
secure and apply on the purchase of the 'property situated at 
County of Ut .Eh , Utf 
ijoct lo any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or olhat* easemsnls or righls of way, government patents or slate deeds of rocord approved by Buyer 
ordanca with Section G. Said property Is owned hyPrtrp ' o f Pr^^ . ttigfrnpj I D S H h n r r h as sailers, and Is more particularly dascrib 
ApprnximafcrOy L 5 f\r.r*<; v.nfhin t-hq prnpnsflri PanoCTmn Pninhn Phmn #1 
JHEGK APPLICABLE BOXES: 
&^ UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY £>Vacant Lot 
3 IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY G Commercial 
fQ Vacant Acreage CPOther 
• Residential D Condo • Other 
(a) IncluoWd Items, Unless excluded below, this sale ahaH includa all fixtures and any of the ilems shown'In Section A if presently attached to tho propai 
Tha following personal properly shall also be Included In this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to Title: 
Nona I 
(bj Excluded items. The following Items are specifically excluded from this sale: _ ~ . „ _ , _ 
Norv! 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS, Seller represents that the properly Includes the following improvements in the purchase pri 
S^ j public aewer ©connected 
2?aaplic lank Q connected 
^} olher sanitary systsrn. 
BS public water • (^connected 
2 private walar Q connocted 
O w e l l
 t ©connected CPbther 
tQ irrigation walar / secondary system 
# of shares * Company 
OTV antenna 
MSJ^  natural gas CPconnacled 
D master antenna Cf prewired ' f 3 curb and gutter 0 - « ^ <*pi 
CPcon acted « D other rights L L 
^electricity Jj?connecltKi 
<£3* ingress & egress by private easement 
{^dedicated road <Q paved AJ3*\^L~~, 
M/A _L.prior to closing, ^ 1 shall nol be furnish (d) Survey. A certified survoy Q)shall be furnished at the expense of 
(a) Buyer inspection. Buyor has mado a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and S below, accepts it in Hs present phys 
condition, except: « . - , L_i . . —— 
•V 
. -PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price Tor the .property Isl S J y . t y ''fi V 3 T h ^ U S ^ n d * - - »» 
*nn no 
.) which shall be paid as falli 
which represents the afaredescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPpsn>"^ 
representing the approxlmaia balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing., 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by bi 
which obligation boars intorasl at % pat annum with monthly payments of $ j . 
which include; • principal; • interest; • taxes; • insurance; D condo lser t Q other . 
representing th© approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances \ 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears Interest at % per annum with monthly payments of S _ 
which Include: D principal; D Interest; D taxes; D insurance; D condo foes; D othor . 
L&*5QQJ0Q- roprosonling balance. If any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or setter financing, to bo paid a s follows: : 
65
 T000,00 
tnJb?-. secured tav a 1st t rus t deed and note bearing zero (QSO,_jntsresh. Rnloon,, 
nThApavmght on Qece^bof 31
 v 1992. RHVPT fn ffipyf-^n imrirnvrm^nhs. V i i thnu t^ j s ina — 
a degsrlopmant loan ofi ths subject property. 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer Is required to assume an underlying obfigaiion (in 
assumo and/or procure same arut 
maks applicalion within „Z!^z 
interest rala not to oxcood — 
its offer is made subjeel 
Section F shall also apf ly) an outside financing, Buyer agrees to us« best c 
ygr quaUiying {or and Ien^ng instituiron gra/nting said assumption and/or financing. Buyar a 
days after Seile//a«)bepUnc/af this Agreement to oswflLb*^^ and/or obtain tha new (inane 
days after Sailer's accap 
.mortgage loan dis 
Vo. If Buyer d ^ s nakquerrfy for the assumpifon and/orNKancing ^hhin . 
ihis AgreamonL this Agroemenl shall Be voidable at the^?p\icn of ths Seller upon wrjj&n nottcc^allof agrees to pay up lo . 
3, COND(T!PH*AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. N represents that Seller £[ holds till* to the property \ simple ©Is purchasing the property under a r<= 
tie contract. Transfer^ Sellers ownership Inters*, ^ fail be made as sat forth In Section S. Seller agrees to\w.,<<£h good and marketable title to the property, subje 
ncumbranctfS and exceptions noted herein, evidenced bytf?f a currant policy o( title Insurance In Ihe amount of purchase priceCCan abstract of UUQ brouoht eurr* 
gLfi attorney's opinion (Sea Section H). x •% ^ u"8 
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall haw the opportunity to Inapeci the title to the subject property prior to closing, Buyar shall takB » |ed to any easting restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R'a). Buyer Q has U has not reviewed any condominium CC & R'a prior to signing thfe Agree mi 
6, VESTING OF TITLE. Till* shall vest In Buysr as follows: WocdcldC i ' l C T i ^ ' C o r p ^ a t i O f t , Q U t a h C Q I p O r a t i u f t 
6, SELLERS WARHANTIES, in addition to warranties contained in Section C, Ihe fallowing Items are also warranted:. 
Nono - • ^ 
eptions to the above and Section C shall ba limited to tha fallowing: _ _ l c = 2 £ £ s i :__ 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES, This offer fa mada subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which muai be satis 
>r to dosing: Approval of VJnocMrip Homes Roaxd-of Directors within 10 days of receiv^i^g -
aocnnted offer hflck from Rftllnr. m rising frn HP» on HT hnforp ApHI ?a\ 1QQ9 
J a r trn prnvk)r> a rtony nP hhn . e ; n i h -p^p^rf p r P v n n n O y rnmp*|c*-t-pH nq *hg> p T n j > n t 
Jar t o allOlV b u y e r t n s h n h w r i t e r , W H ^ T J gppnnrfory war^r t«n rhn prnp-vH-y p^r ? -» l;,n p j o ^ n g 
0, CLOSING OF SALE, This Agreement shall bs closed on or before . SCO AhOVO • 1 9 a ! a reasonable location to be designate* . .1 . 
ler, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer ahall deposit with tha escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete ihe purchase in accordance 
Agreement, Prorations set forth In Section R shall be mada as of D date of poss^ssionR^ date of closing • other , . 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer en SJLC^> &iaau~g. unlesa^actonded by written agreement of parties. 
0. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At tha. awning of this Agreement Ihe listing agent f ' \ represents ( ) Seller ( ) Bt 
\ the selling aganl t~/ljZXZ represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. Buyer and Salter confirm, that prior to signing this Agreei 
rten disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. { ) ( ) Buyer's initials ( ) ( ) Seller's Initiala. 
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED A90VE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE E 
CEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE., 
iyer. / ^ • 
'© until 
>NEY 
TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller 
8 9 2 -
 r to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapae and the Agent shall return the EARf 
^ J ? 7 S 500 Fast , Mm, S i r , Mt-frh &U32 575-OMQ 
yfif's'SlpJ^aJareL^ (Dais) (Addles) 
fadley Simons, Vico President Woodsids Homes Corporation 
(Phone) (SSN/TA 
rear's- Signature) (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSNfiTi* 
5CK ONE 
I ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the Foregoing otter on tha larms and conditions specified above. 
I REJECTION. Seller horaby REJECTS tha foregoing offer,, (Seller's Initiate;) 
I COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO Ihe exceptions or modidcalions &s specified below or In tha attachod Addendur 
>rasents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall havo until ^//0& (A^gjffi
 rA&m*&>~SS <&%. , ™p\T, t* accept the 
;peclfted below. 
s?V-£&r/>r?s/ ^7 r/s/^^syS^s-m^ 
altera S i g n a W a ) ^ ( D a f e ) * ^ ( T i m e ) (Address) (Pnone) (SSN/T 
(Data) fTlme) (Address} altar's Signature) 
•ISCK ONE: 
] ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
] REJECTION. Suyor hereby REJECTS tho COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials} 
] COUNTER OFFER. 8uyor hereby ACCEPTS tho COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
(Phone) (SSNH 
uyer's Signaiure) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Data) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
Stare Law requires Broker to furnish Buyar and Sallar wllh copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures, (Ona of the following alternatives must therefore be con 
A. • I acknowledge recaipt of a final copy of Ihe foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures* 
3NA7UR6 OF SSlXEfl SIGNATURE OF SUYcH 





Addendum to Earnest Money Agreement to Sell 
This is a legally binding document. 
If not understood, seek competent advice. 
Property Number 
Property Address 
April 14, 1992 
519-2072 
150 N 950 East, Lindon, Utah S4W2 
I'HgC 
PURCHASER 
Woodslde Homes Corporation 
c/o J, Dudley Simony Vice President 
127 South 500 East, ^600 
Salt Uko CUy, Utah 34X02 
Phone # (801)-57S-85KW 
Fed ID/SS # 37-032S7W 
SELLER 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
ft Utah corporation sole 
L PROPERTY DESCRIPTION. The eamese money agreement dated April 9,1992, and between Woo&side Homes Cnrpor-irion, as Purchaser, mi 
Corporation of the Presiding; Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a Utah corporation sole, as Seller, for the purchase of the proper! 
situated in the city of l indon, county of Utah, state of Utah, loiowa as (address): 150 S )5Q East, Lindon, Utah 54052, and described either on "Exhibit /» 
aliachcd hereto hereto, or as sat forth below is modified and amended as follows: 
XBS ncres more-or-Iess vacant ground* Legal description lo be attached. Set attached plaL 
Propcrry Tux Number 14-074-0022 
IL CONVEYANCE. The property shall be conveyed by special or limited warranty deed to Purchaser with title vesled as follows: 
To be determined at closing.. 
III. APPROPRIATION COMMITTEE APPROVAL. The terms and conditions of the anticipated sale ns set forth in the earnest money agreement ai 
this addendum require approval within a reasonable time by the Seller's Appropriation Committee 
IV. DOCUMENT APPROVAL Alt documents must be prepared or reviewed by and receive the approval of the Seller's Office of General Counsel. Shot 
receipt of such approval delay the scheduled closing dale, upon Seller's request Purchaser will grant Seller an additional 30 days' time In which lo close this s, 
and deliver possession of the propcrry. 
V. CLOSING DATU The closing dale shall be on or before the 15 day of May, 1992, and Seller shall grant possession of the properly lo Purchaser 
or before ihe1 day of May, 1992. 
VI. WATHR RIGHTS. Seller shall retain all water rights whether or not appurtenant unless specifically noted otherwise In this addendum. 
VII. KNTIRGY RIGKTS. Seller shall retain ail oil, gas„ mineral, geo thermal, and other energy rights. If the propeny consists of in excess of five (5) nc 
Seller shall also reserve the right of ingress and egress for exploration and production of the oil, gas, mineral, geo thermal, and other energy rights. 
V7IL D £ £ Q P RSTRI CTi ONS. If Seller rcrains ownership of immediately adjoining property or if a chapel constructed by Seller if located upon Ihc prop* 
Seller shall impose restrictions with a right of re-entry in the deed to Purchaser providing tha.c no alcoholic beverages or intoxicated liquor shall be roanufnciu 
kept for sale, nor sold on the propcrry, nor shall a place of public entertainment or amusement be operated on the property. 
IX. CREDIT SALE. If the propcrry is being sold on credit, Purchaser shall provide, pay for, and maintain a fire insurance policy providing: at least D 
Form coverage in ihc amount of nol less than 50% of the insurable value of the improvements included in the above described propcrry. Sellers interest 
be protected by use of the standard mortgagee clause used in the area wherein the propcrry is located. The mortgagee shall be identified as: 
Corporation of the Presiding EUhop of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
a Utah corporation sole 
Finance and Records Department 
Propeny No. 519-2072 
50 East North Temple Slrect 
Sail Lake City, UTB4 ISO 
At closing. Purchaser shall deliver a binder of Insurance, effective for not less than 60 days, and showing Seller's mortgagee interest, Prior to the expirat 
the 60-day binder, Purchaser shall furnish to Seller a certified copy of the insurance policy ftied in compliance with this section. Such policy shall ue iss 
a company or companies, and oa a form or forms, acceptable to Seller, The term insurable value as used above shall mean the replacement cost 
improvements less depreciation, and further reduced by such values as are normally excluded in fire insurance policies issued in the area in which the 
described property is located* The InsuraDle value shall be subject to the approval of Seller. 
CBIVEB APR 3. 0 B& 
perry Number 
perry Address 
Apni w ; i » a 
519-2072 
150 N 950 East, Undon, Utah &4062 
"rage 2 
BT?qF.T,L OR TRANSFER, Purchaser agrees that it will not resell or transfer the property without Seller's written consent, v/hich may be withheld, 
the parties agree that any approved sale or transfer wilt be subject to an assumption fee imposed by Seller as a condition for approving such transfer or 
:, purchaser agrees to sign Seller's standard non-assumption agreement and to be bound thereby. 
iJiTE PAYMENTS- If the sale anticipated by the earnest money agreement Involves periodic payments, a ia(e payment efcarge of 5% of each payment 
II be paid by Purchaser to Seller far each payment received by Seller more than ten (10) day* after the due date for suctf" payment. 
'- CREDIT RISK, A credit sale is subject to Seller's approval of Purchaser as a credit risk. 
A., purchaser agrees to submit a financial statement with this signed addendum. 
D. Seller, at its option, may obtain a credit report on Purchaser from a credit reporting agency. 
II, ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: 
rchose price to be $8J),M,00 all cash at closing 
[V, ATTORNEYS FHE5. If either parry employs an attorney to enforce the earnest money agreement with this addendum, the party fa default shall p*y 
e prevailing party the reasonable expenses of the prevailing parry, including but not limited to attorney's fees reasonably incurred, whether occasioned by 
igation or not. 
/ , ENTIRE ACiRHEMEOT. The terms of this addendum and the agrecmenito which It is attached constitute the entire contract between the parties, 
4 any modification* of this entire agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties. If there arc any conflicts between the agreement provisions imU 
c addendum provisions, or the application of cither, the terms and conditions as set forth in the addendum, and the application of those addendum terms 
d conditions, shall prevail and govern the entire agreement between the parties* 
JkCILUIift 
'J-to&tifi'J&e \>^^^$^^^ 4 
jrehaser 
urchaser Signa6ucfr Date 
SELLER " 
Church Real Estate RcgpeScntative Date 
urchascr £xrgnature Date 
"FINAL APPROVAL (as per &cciob 111) 
Corporation of the Presiding Dishop of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, a Utah corporation sole, 
Authorfced Agent's Signature 
IBCKirT * —j 
acknowledge receipt of the final copy of the fopegotng agreement bearing all signatures. 
Date 
SELLER 
Church Real Estate Representative Date 
tECBIVEB APR $ 0 Was 
SECURITY T1T15 t ABSTRACT CO 
55 East Co«(»r $|. . p r „ a U u | i 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah corporation sole, GRANTOR, of Salt Lake City, 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby conveys and warrants against all claiming by, through 
or under it, and against acts of itself, to WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, GRANTEE, of 127 South 50Q East, #600, Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, Stale 
« 
of Utah, for the sum of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable 
consideration, the following parcel of land, situate in the County of Utah, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which Is North 151.51 feet and East 1,065.60 feet from ihe 
West 1/4 comer of Section 35, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence along the arc of a 339.027 foot radius curve to the left 131.135 
feet, the chord of which bears South 66* Q6' 24H West 130.319 feet; thence South 55* 
01* 33* West 318.99 feet; thence along the arc of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the 
right 23.562 feet, the chord of which bears North 79* 5ff 27" West 21.213 feet; 
thence North 34* 58f 27* West 136.10 feet; thence along the arc of a 216.065 foot 
radius curve to the right 130342 feet, the chord of which bears North 17° 41* 32" 
West 128375 feet; thence North 0* 24' 37H West 66,50 feet; thence North 55% 01" 33«* 
East 530,00 feet; thence South 12* 48' 44" East 381.68 feet to the point of beginning. 
Basis of Bearing: Section line from West 1/4 corner to Northwest corner of said 
Section 35 being North V 24' 37" West. 
The Grantor specifically reserves and excepts unto Itself all minerals, coal, carbons, 
hydrocarbons, oil, gas, chemical elements and compounds whether In solid, liquid, 
or gaseoos form, and ail steam and other forms of thermal energy on, tn, or under 
the aboy* described land provided that Grantor does not reserve the right to use 
the subject property or extract minerals or other substances from the subject 
property above a depth of 500 Teet, nor does Grantor reserve the right to use the 
surface of the subject property la connection with the rights reserved herein. 
Subject ta easements, rights, rights-of-way, reservations, conditions, restrictions, 
covenants and taxes and assessments of record or enforceable In law or equity. 
Together with and subject to an access and utility right-of-way, 5Q feet wide, 25 feet 
either side of the following described centerllne to-wit: 
EHT 3 9 7 5 7 BK 2 9 7 8 PQ 4 9 * 3 
KINA E ROD UTAH CQ RECORDER BY AC 
1992 m i « : 0 3 Att FEE 5 . 5 0 
RECQRBED FOR SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
Property #51^2072-61/92-50292 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
l ^ M l n n i n o flf « nntnf n » *>.- ^ w f A ^ U * n7 14A WnrtK C ^ A f T \i%Ai\* TU*fc " U n n U t 
E N T 3 ? 7 3 7 &K 2 ? 7 S PQ *<?»* 
Lkdon Hills Flat EA* as recorded in the Utah! 
said point i|Lib being South 153JI (eet and EasM57, 
fitacir S|ct$&n 35i - to^Up S S&ustfi, Range ffeist; s4 |J 
thence along fat arc of a 95.1(53 foot radius curve to the ffj™ .^ . -,,., , _ „ 
of wlUch bears Smith 6V 4P 32' East 88.525 feet; tlxente $Sffilr$r S f f ^ r ! # 
20.1? feet to the intersection with a proposed street; thence North 55* 01'33" Bast 
145.6113 feet Co the Intersection with a proposed str«tt safd 5ntlrsectWn being at the 
Southwest comer of the 4-acre chapel site; thence NorittS$%m% 33* East parallel 
to and 25 feet perpendicular Southeasterly from the South property line of the 
chapel site 3$8,99 feet to a point which 1$ North 7824 feet and East m.n feet from 
the West Quarter Corner of said section. 
Basis of Bearing: Section Line from West Quarter Corner to Northwest Corner of 
said Section 35 being North D4 24' 37" West. State Plan Coordinates of the West 
Quarter Corner as established by Utah County Surveyor are North = 731,388.54 
East *. 1,945,478.88 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereto subscribed its name and 
affixed its corporate seal, by its authorized agent, this 19th day of June, 1992, 
i % t . '
| , l - M , l
» . . 
. . . y . * \ CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
.• V* ^ \ \ ' \ BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Uiah 



















STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 19th day of June, 1992, personally appeared before me Richard C« Edgley 
personally known to me to be the authorized agent for the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, who acknowledged to me that he signed the 
foregoing instrument as authorized agent for the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a Utah corporation sole, and that the seal impressed 
on the within instrument is the seal of said corporation, and the said Richard C, Edgley 
acknowledged to me that the said corporation executed the same. 
/T/foy 
Notary Public in and fat the 
State of Utah 
X I H Y - 1 5 - 9 7 THU 0 3 : 3 1 PH FAX NO, P, 07 
TEST HOLE NO. 2 
ELEVATION: 4 8 7 9 . 0 
SOIL DESCRIPTION 




SILT(ML) to Silty SAND 
(SM), brittle, calcare-
ous, occasional sand and 
gravel, loose to medium 
12/12 dense, dry, light brown 
with white streaks 
SAND(SM), silty, trace 
cobbles at 10-12*, 
medium dense, dry, light 
28/12 brown 
EOTH @ 16.5' 








TEST HOLE NO. 10 
ELEVATION;. 4 8 8 2 , 0 
PI w DO OTHER TEST5 SOIL DESCRIPTION 
r v TOPSOIL: 12" SILT 
SILT(ML), s a n d y , l o o s e , 
dry t o m o i s t , brown 
6/12 
SAND(SM), silty with 
layers of sandy SILT and 
gravelly SAND, fine 
grained, loose to medium 





LL PI W DD OTHER TESTS 
- 35 
TEST HOLE NO. 10 ( c o n t . ) 






EOTH -S 41.5' 










TEST HOLE NO. 7 
ELEVATION: 4 B 6 0 . 0 
SOIL DESCRIPTION 
TOPSOIL: 8" SILT 
SILT (ML) to s i l t y SAND (SH) 
Trace gravel , ca lcareous , l o o s e , 
dry, l i g h t bsawn v/ith white 
deposi ts 
EETH £ 6,5 s 
No free water encountered 
11111 1 */ 
5»6-V» 
Wl/4 AFR a a 
r*N i^, A « r * r * f » • » 
02/22/96 08:38 KMG ARCHITECTS 002 
mMM d 8 
EXHIBIT "D 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALI S. YAZD and PARVIN YOUSEFI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 020402197 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
May 28, 2002, Plaintiffs submitted their Complaint alleging four causes of action. On August 14, 
2002, this Court dismissed all claims of breach of warranty and compelled arbitration. The claim 
of mutual mistake was likewise arbitrated. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment addresses only the remaining claims of fraudulent non-disclosure §nd fraudulent 
concealment. 
On September 29, 2003, a hearing was held to consider the issues raised by Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Prior to the hearing, both parties submitted various memoranda 
of points and authorities in further support of their positions. The Court has considered the 
memoranda filed by the parties, the testimony provided at the hearing, the relevant case law and 
statutory provisions, and being folly advised in the matter, issues the following ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
1. Woodside Homes Corporation ("Woodside") owned land that became known as the 
Panorama Point Subdivision ("Subdivision") located in Lindon, Utah. 
2. In preparation for the construction of the Subdivision, Woodside hired the geotechnical 
engineering firm currently known as Amec Earth & Environmental ("Amec") to conduct 
an investigation of the soils in the subdivision and prepare a report. 
3. Amec's Report indicated that the upper one and one-half to two and one-half feet of soil 
were moisture sensitive and collapsible and recommended the removal of this soil. 
4. On or about March 11,1995, Plaintiffs entered into a purchase agreement with Woodside 
for the construction of a house on lot 304 of the Subdivision. 
5. Between six to eight feet of soil was removed from lot 304 during the construction of 
Plaintiffs' house. 
6. William Gordon, an engineer at Amec, visited lot 304 during the construction of Plaintiffs' 
house to inspect the soil removal. Mr. Gordon determined that the underlying soils would 
support the house and made recommendations concerning the placement and compaction 
of structural fill. 
7. Woodside understood that the soil excavation on lot 304 had removed all collapsible soils. 
8. Woodside followed the recommendations of Mr. Gordon before laying the foundation of 
Plaintiffs' house. 
9. The Plaintiffs experienced cracking in the foundation of the house and settling of the 
structure. 
10. Soil reports were also performed on land adjacent to the Plaintiffs' lot, including a report 
conducted by Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. This report was conducted on land 
originally owned by the LDS Church, which was later sold to Woodside. 
11. The LDS Church had planned to construct a large single structure that was different from 
the single family homes being constructed by Woodside. 
12. The Delta report indicated the presence of six to sixteen feet of loose to medium density 
silty sand. 
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13. The Delta report did not include an analysis of lot 304, the lot purchased by Plaintiffs. 
14. Woodside was not in possession of the Delta report until after the construction and sale of 
Plaintiffs' house. 
RULING 
According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." After reviewing the pleadings and listening to 
oral arguments, the Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist. 
The only issue in dispute is what knowledge Woodside had regarding collapsible soils on 
Plaintiffs' lot. The facts demonstrate that (1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the 
existence of collapsible soils on Plaintiffs' lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six 
and eight feet of soil was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting 
the excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would support the 
Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils engine^IiM&^tng the 
foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and after t£e completion of Plaintiffs' 
house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot. 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils 
on Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that would preclude 
entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside. 
In deciding whether Defendant, Woodside, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the 
Court considers two arguments brought by the Plaintiffs: (1) whether Woodside's conduct 
constituted fraudulent non-disclosure, and (2) whether Woodside's conduct constituted fraudulent 
concealment. 
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I. Fraudulent Non-disclosure 
In order "to support a claim of fraudulent non-disclosure a plaintiff must prove the 
following three elements: (1) the non-disclosed information is material, (2) the non-disclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to 
communicate." Mitchell v. Christensenu 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 2001). 
It is clear that the continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information. 
Therefore, to decide whether Woodside acted fraudulently, it must be determined if any non-
disclosed information was known to them and whether they had a legal duty to communicate such 
information to the Plaintiffs. Given the undisputed facts, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' 
fraudulent non-disclosure claim against Woodside fails because there were no facts presented to 
show that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on lot 304. In fact, the soil engineer, Mr. 
Gordon, indicated to Woodside that lot 304 was suitable for construction. Because Plaintiffs 
cannot establish that Woodside had knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows that 
there can be no duty to disclose the information to the Plaintiffs. 
II. Fraudulent Concealment 
Similarly, "[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to 
communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him." 
McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997). 
There are no facts to indicate that Woodside remained silent or acted to conceal material 
facts known to them. In fact, Woodside had no\knowledge of the possibility of remaining 
collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, because material facts were not known to them, 
Woodside had no duty or obligation to communicate any such information and Plaintiffs' claim of 
fraudulent concealment fails. 
This Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Defendant is 
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling within twenty (20) 
days of the date of this ruling and submit it for the Court's signature. 
DATED this (0 day of October, 2003. £R'G/,, 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020402197 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail STEPHEN QUESENBERRY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
3319 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVE 
JAMESTOWN SQUARE, SUITE 2 00 
PROVO, UT 84604 
Mail TIMOTHY B SMITH 
ATTORNEY DEF 
185 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 13 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-1537 
Dated this l4 day of QcJ- 20^3. 
Deputy Cour 
Page 1 (last) 
